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AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS v. ARMY CORPS OF 
ENGINEERS: 
IGNORING CHEVRON AND THE CLEAN WATER ACT'S 
BROAD PURPOSES 
. by Bradford C. Mank 1 
In 1993, the United States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") 
and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (hereinafter 
"agencies") used their shared authority to protect wetlands under 
section 404 of the Clean Water Act ("Act") to jointly promulgate 
the so-called Tulloch rule to regulate the harmful environmental 
effects of incidental fallback from dredging operations.2 In Amer-
ican Mining Congress v. Army Corps of Engineers,3 the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia concluded that 
Congress did not intend that incidental fallback from excavation 
or dredging should be considered the discharge of dredge or fill 
material into navigable waters under the Act and, accordingly, 
that the agencies did not have the authority to require a permit 
for this activity.4 
Under the principles of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc.,5 Judge Harris should have de-
ferred to the agencies' interpretation of section 404(a). While 
there is little specific support in the Act's text or legislative his-
tory for the agencies' interpretation, Judge Harris overstated the 
extent to which Congress had indicated that it did not want the 
agencies to regulate incidental fallback. As long as a statute is 
ambiguous, Chevron requires a court to defer to an agency's 
interpretation even if a different interpretation may have some-
what stronger support in the statute or better fit the judge's 
1. Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. A.B., Harvard, 
1983; J.D., Yale Law School, 1987. 
2. Army Corps of Engineers & EPA, Clean Water Act Regulatory Programs, 58 
Fed. Reg. 45008, 45009-13 (1993) (codified at various C.F.R. sections, including 33 
C.F.R. Pts. 323 & 328); Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 
§ 404(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1997). 
3. 951 F. Supp. 267 (D.D.C. 1997). 
4. [d. at 272-78. 
5. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
51 
HeinOnline -- 25 N. Ky. L. Rev. 52 1997-1998
52 NORTHERN KENTUCKY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:1 
policy views.s Because section 404(a) is ambiguous regarding the 
agencies' authority to regulate incidental fallback material from 
dredging and the agencies' interpretation plausibly serves the 
Act's broad purposes in protecting wetlands, the district court 
erred in striking down the Tulloch rule. On appeal, the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ought to reverse the 
district court and reinstate the Tulloch rule. 
Part I of this article will provide a brief introduction to section 
404 of the Clean Water Act. Part II will examine the Tulloch 
rule. Part III will examine the district court's opinion. Finally, 
part IV will demonstrate that section 404(a) is ambiguous re-
garding whether incidental fallback from dredging may in some 
circumstances constitute disposal under the statute and, accord-
ingly, that under the Chevron doctrine the district court erred in 
failing to defer to the agencies' Tulloch rule. 
I. SECTION 404 REQUIRES PERMITS FOR DISCHARGING 
DREDGE OR FILL 
The Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 18997 requires 
a permit for dredging or filling activities that may obstruct navi-
gation in navigable waters8 suitable for commercial 
transportation, and applies to waters or tidal wetlands located 
below mean high water.9 Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors 
Appropriations Act of 1899 defines the Corps' jurisdiction over 
excavation activities. 1o 
In 1972, Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act (Clean Water Act).ll Section 404 of the Act seeks to pro-
6. Id. at 842-43. 
7. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403, 407 (1986). 
8. See 33 C.F.R. § 329.4 (1998) which defines navigable waters as "those waters 
that are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide and/or are presently used, or have 
been used in the past, or may be susceptible for use to transport interstate or for-
eign commerce." 
9. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403, 407; 33 C.F.R. § 329.4 (1997); Bayou des Familles 
Dev. Corp. v. United States Corps of Eng'rs, 541 F. Supp. 1025, 1034 (E.D. La. 
1982); See generally Carol E. Dinkins et aI., Regulatory Obstacles to Development and 
Redevelopment: Wetlands and Other Essential Issues, in THE IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 
ON REAL ESTATE AND OrnER COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS, SB18 ALI-ABA 731, 734 (Oct. 10, 
1996). 
10. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1997) (Stating that the Corps must authorize excavation or 
filling of navigable waters). 
11. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1997). 
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tect wetlands by requiring any person who "discharge[s] dredge 
or fill material into the navigable waters at specified disposal 
sites" to obtain a permit from the COrpS.12 The term "pollutant" 
encompasses "dredged spoil.,,13 Section 502(12) defines a "dis-
charge" as "any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters 
from any point source.,,14 While the Corps has primary responsi-
bility for issuing permits,15 subject to the EPA's veto authori-
ty/6 both agencies have authority to issue binding regulations 
and guidance documents to regulate the disposal of dredged ma-
terials in waters.17 
II. THE TULLOCH RULE 
The Corps defines "discharge of dredged material" as the addi-
tion of material excavated or dredged from waters of the United 
States, including runoff from a dredged material disposal 
area. IS From 1972 until 1993, the agencies did not regulate un-
der section 404 incidental fallback or movement from dredging or 
excavation of materials from navigable waters, including · 
landclearing, ditching, or channelization, unless the agency could 
establish substantial environmental impacts or the relocation of 
the dredged materials.19 
In North Carolina Wildlife Federation v. Tulloch,20 environ-
mental organizations sued the Corps, the EPA and two landown-
ers alleging that landclearing and excavation activities involving 
700 acres of wetlands caused significant environmental damage 
and, therefore, should be subject to regulation under section 
404.21 In 1992, the agencies settled the case by agreeing to 
12. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 § 404(a), 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1344(a) (1997). 
13. Id. § 1362(6). 
14. Id. § 1362(12). 
15. Id. § 1344(a). 
16. Id. § 1344(c). 
17. Id. § 1344(b)(1). 
18. 33 C.F.R. §§ 323.2(2), 323.2(c), 323.2(d) (1997); see also Dinkins, supra note 9, 
at 735. 
19. See 51 Fed. Reg. 41206, 41210 (1986); American Mining Congress v. Army 
Corps of Eng'rs, 951 F. Supp. 267, 269 (D.D.C. 1997); United States v. Lambert, 589 
F. Supp. 366 (M.D. Fla. 1984); Dinkins, supra note 9, at 735-36. 
20. Civil No. C90-713-CIV-5-BO (E.D.N.C. filed Nov. 30, 1990). The case is noted 
in Current Deuelopments, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1681 (Jan. 21, 1994). 
21. See 58 Fed. Reg. at 45016 (noting the Tulloch case involved excavation 
causing extensive destruction of hundreds of acres of wetlands). 
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propose a rule regulating the addition or redeposit of dredged 
materials, including excavated materials, into wetlands. 22 Mter 
providing a sixty-day public comment period, on August 25, 
1993, the agencies issued a final rule that essentially incorporat-
ed the terms of the settlement agreement.23 
The Tulloch rule redefines the term "discharge of dredged 
material" to include small-volume incidental fallback unless the 
party conducting the activity can establish that it will not harm 
or degrade wetlands or waters of the United States.24 Incidental 
fallback includes any soil that is disturbed when a shovel exca-
vates dirt, or any back-spill that falls from a shovel or bucket 
and falls back into the same place from which it was removed.25 
Incidental fallback does not include soil moved or deposited away 
from the original site.26 Under section 404, the agencies have 
from the beginning regulated so-called "side casting," which in-
volves depositing removed soil alongside a ditch, and careless 
disposal practices involving significant discharges into waters.27 
The Tulloch rule significantly increased the scope of the 
agencies' section 404 jurisdiction because any mechanized 
landclearing or dredging activities will result in some incidental 
fallback, and, accordingly, the rule brings mechanized 
landclearing, ditching, channelization, or other excavation opera-
tions within the section 404 permit program.28 Previously, the 
agencies only regulated incidental fallback if it caused substan-
22. 58 Fed. Reg. 45008 (1993). 
23. 58 Fed. Reg. 45008, 45009·13, 45035-38 (1993) (codified at various C.F.R. 
sections, including 33 C.F.R. Pts. 323 & 328). 
24. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 323.2(d)(1)(iii), (d)(3)(i), (d)(4) (1998) (Corps regulations); 40 
C.F.R. §§ 232.2(1)(iii), 232.2(3)(i), (4) (1998) (EPA regulations); 58 Fed. Reg. at 45019-
21 (1993) (defining "destroy" and "degrade," 45035-38); see also American Mining Con-
gress, 951 F. Supp. at 270 & n.3; Dinkins, supra note 9, at 735. 
25. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(1)(iii) (1998) (Corps regulations); 40 C.F.R. § 232.2(1)(iii) 
(1998) (EPA regulations); 58 Fed. Reg. at 45009-13 (1993); see also American Mining 
Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 270 & n.4. 
26. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(1)(iii) (1998) (Corps regulations); 40 C.F.R. § 232.2(1)(iii) 
(1998) (EPA regulations); 58 Fed. Reg. at 45009-13 (1993); see also American Mining 
Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 270 & n.4. . 
27. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(1)(iii) (1998) (Corps regulations); 40 C.F.R. § 232.2(1)(iii) 
(1998) (EPA regulations); 58 Fed. Reg. at 45014 (1993); see also American Mining 
Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 270 & n.4; Dinkins, supra note 9, at 736. 
28. See 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(1)(iii) (1998) (Corps regulations); 40 C.F.R. 
§ 232.2(1)(iii) (1998) (EPA regulations); 58 Fed. Reg. at 45017-19 (1993) (describing 
mechanized iandclearing, ditching, channelization and other excavation activities); see 
also American Mining Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 270 & n.3. 
HeinOnline -- 25 N. Ky. L. Rev. 55 1997-1998
1997] AMC v. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS 55 
tial environmental impacts, and the presumption was against 
regulation of incidental fallback even if large discharges were 
involved, unless the agencies could establish environmental ef-
fects. 29 The Tulloch rule creates a rebuttable presumption that 
shifts the burden to the regulated party to demonstrate, before 
beginning a project, that the federal government does not have 
jurisdiction over the activity.30 To rebut this presumption, the 
regulated party must show that the activity will have de minimis 
environmental impacts and not harm or degrade wetlands or 
waters of the United States.31 The agencies announced in the 
Tulloch rule that they would apply a very low threshold for what 
constitutes an environmental effect and, accordingly, there is a 
significant burden on regulated parties to show that their activi-
ties will cause no harm.32 In determining what constitutes an 
environmental impact that may harm or degrade waters of the 
United States, the agencies not only examine the direct environ-
mental impacts of the incidental fallback, but also claim the 
authority to regulate indirect or secondary environmental effects 
associated with dredging, mechanized landclearing, ditching, 
channelization or excavation activities as long as there is a dis-
charge of dredged or fill material, including incidental 
fallback. 33 
Because a discharge to navigable waters of the United States 
is "an absolute prerequisite" to the exercise of government au-
thority under section 404, the Tulloch rule does not apply to 
mere removal activities.34 Furthermore, the rule excludes de 
minimis soil movement incidental to any activity that does not or 
29. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(1)(iii) (1998) (Corps regulations); 40 C.F.R. § 232.2(1)(iii) 
(1998) (EPA regulations); 58 Fed. Reg. at 45009-13, 45035-38 (1993); see also Ameri-
can Mining Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 270 & n.3. 
30. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 323.2(c)(2), 323.2(d)(3)(i) (1998) (Corps regulations); 40 C.F.R. 
§§ 232.2(2), 232.2(3)(i) (1998) (EPA regulations); 58 Fed. Reg. at 45021-22 (1993) 
(creating presumption that dredging and excavation activities destroy or degrade); see 
also American Mining Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 270 & n.3. 
31. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 323.2(d)(1)(iii), (d)(3)(i), (d)(4) (1998) (Corps regulations); 40 
C.F.R. §§ 232.2(1)(iii), 232.2(3)(i), (4) (1998) (EPA regulations); 58 Fed. Reg. at 45019-
22, 45035-38 (1993) (defining "destroy" and "degrade" and "de minimis" and creating 
presumption that dredging and excavation activities destroy or degrade); American 
Mining Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 270 & n.3; Dinkins, supra note 9, at 735. 
32. See 58 Fed. Reg. at 45020-21' (1993). 
33. See 58 Fed. Reg. at 45011-13 (1993); see supra note 28 and accompanying . 
text. 
34. 58 Fed. Reg. at 45011 (1993). 
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would not have the effect of destroying or degrading wetlands or 
waters, which means that the activity alters an area so it would 
no longer be a water of the United States.35 Conveniently, the 
agencies exempted incidental movement of dredged material' 
resulting from dredging designed to improve navigation in navi-
gable waters, an exemption that applies as a practical matter 
only to the Corps.36 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION 
A. The Parties' Arguments 
The American Mining Congress and other development inter-
ests filed suit challenging the Tulloch rule as exceeding the 
agencies' authority under section 404 of the Act because Con-
gress never intended for incidental fallback to be within the 
statute's jurisdiction.37 They contended that the Tulloch rule 
used the concept of "incidental fallback" as a justification for 
expanding the agencies' jurisdiction to regulate excavating and 
landclearing activities that are not otherwise within the scope of 
the section 404 permit program.3S 
By contrast, the agencies maintained that they were autho-
rized to regulate incidental fallback, and that Chevron required 
the district court to defer to their expertise in interpreting the 
Act.39 They argued that incidental fallback was always regulat-
ed by them, but that they had created a narrow exception from 
the permit requirement for de minimis discharges. 4o The agen-
cies contended that the Tulloch rule merely closes a loophole in 
the Act by tightening a de minimis exception within their discre-
35. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 323.2(d)(1)(iii), (d)(3)(i), (d)(4) (1998) (Corps regulations); 40 
C.F.R. §§ 232.2(1)(iii), 232.2(e)(3)(i), (4) (1998) (EPA regulations); 58 Fed. Reg. at 
45019·21, 45026, 45035·38 (1993) (defining "destroy" and "degrade" and excluding 
incidental soil movement during "normal" dredging operations); see also American 
Mining Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 270 & n.3; Dinkins, supra note 9, at 735. 
36. See American Mining Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 270 n.3; 58 Fed. Reg. at 
45009-13, 45035-38 (1993). 
37. See American Mining Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 268-71. 
38. See id. at 271. 
39. [d. 
40. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 323.2(d)(1)(iii), (d)(3)(i), (d)(4) (1998) (Corps regulations); 40 
C.F.R. §§ 232.2(1)(iii), 232.2(3)(i), (4) (1998) (EPA regulations); 58 Fed. Reg. at 45019-
21, 45035-38 (1993) (defining "destroy" and "degrade" and "de minimis"); see also 
American Mining Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 270 & n.3; Dinkins, supra note 9, at 
735. 
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tion, and that the rule effectuates the statute's goals in protect-
ing wetlands from degradation.41 
B. The District Court's Decision 
1. Incidental Fallback Is Not the "Addition of a Pollutant." 
The district court concluded that incidental fallback is not the 
"addition of a pollutant" to navigable waters and, therefore, does 
not constitute a "discharge" within the agencies'section 404(a) 
authority.42 Because section 404(a) only authorizes the agencies 
to regulate "discharge[s]" of "dredge or fill material,"43 it is cru-
cial to determine whether incidental fallback constitutes a dis-
charge. 
The American Mining Congress and other plaintiffs argued 
that by defining a "discharge" to require the "addition" of a "pol-
lutant," Congress intended to regulate only the introduction or 
placement of dredged material into water, and not the incidental 
fallback that accompanies the removal of material from naviga-
ble waters.44 Instead, section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Ap-
propriations Act of 1899 defines the Corps' jurisdiction over exca-
vation activities.45 
The defendant agencies argued that the term "addition of 
pollutants" is ambiguous and that the district court should defer 
to its interpretation under the Chevron doctrine.46 While the 
district court properly concluded that Congress did not want the 
agencies to regulate de minimis amounts of incidental fallback, 
the court should have given the agencies more latitude in deter-
mining when incidental fallback may constitute an "addition of 
41. Compare 33 C.F.R. §§ 323.2(d)(1)(iii), (d)(4) (1998) (Corps regulations) and 40 
C.F.R. §§ 232.2(1)(iii), 232.2(4) (1998) (EPA regulations) and 58 Fed. Reg. at 45019-
21, 45035-38 (1993) (defining "destroy" and "degrade" and "de minimis" very broadly 
to protect the environment from effects of dredging and excavation activities) with 
American Mining Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 271 (criticizing the agencies' broad defini-
tion of degradation and the agencies' rule placing the burden on the regulated party 
to prove its activities are de minimis). 
42. American Mining Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 272-78. 
43. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 § 404(a), 33 
U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1997). 
44. American Mining Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 272. 
45. See 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1997) (Corps must authorize excavation or filling of 
navigable waters). 
46. American Mining Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 272. 
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pollutants" and "discharge" under the Act. 
a. Under section 404(a), excavation or dredging activities do not 
constitute a "discharge." 
The district court correctly concluded that under section 404(a) 
excavation or dredging activities do not constitute a "discharge," 
but erroneously inferred as a result that incidental fallback may 
never constitute an "addition of pollutant" and "discharge." Be-
cause section 10 of the Rivers and Appropriations Act of 1899 
explicitly defines the Corps' jurisdiction over excavation activi-
ties47 and section 404 does not expressly refer to such matters, 
the district court argued that Congress intended to regulate 
removal activities only under the former statute and the disposal 
of material only under the latter.48 Even if section 404(a)'s juris-
diction does not reach removal activities, that does not resolve 
whether incidental fallback constitutes an "addition of pollutant" 
or "discharge" under the Act. 
b. Under the Act, the term "discharge" does not include 
incidental fallback. 
While acknowledging that neither the Act's 1972 or 1977 legis-
lative history specifically refers to "incidental fallback," the dis-
trict court argued that Congress had a very definite view regard-
ing the meaning of the term "discharge" under section 404(a) and 
that its intent was that incidental fallback does not constitute 
disposal under the statute.49 According to the district court, 
Congress intended the term "discharge of dredged material to 
mean open water disposal of material removed during the dig-
ging or deepening of navigable waterways," and that this pur-
pose "excludes the small-volume incidental discharge that accom-
panies excavation and landclearing activities."50 In 1977, Sena-
tor Muskie, a leading force in writing the Act, stated that the 
statute was not intended to regulate "de minimis" activities. 51 
47. See 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1997) (Corps must authorize excavation or filling of 
navigable waters). 
48. American Mining Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 272-73. 
49. [d. at 273-74. 
50. [d. at 273. 
51. [d. (quoting Senate Report on section 1952, 95th Cong., reprinted in 1977 
Legis. Hist. at 645). 
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Furthermore, in 1977, Senator Domenici indicated that Congress 
did not intend the Act to regulate someone who merely "mov[es] 
a little bit of earth .... "52 Because landclearing or dredging 
activities routinely result in some incidental fallback, the district 
court maintained that the remarks of Senators Muskie and 
Domenici suggest that Congress did not intend the statute to 
reach such small and routine movements of soil as disposal ac-
tivities.53 Neither Senator Muskie nor Domenici's statements, 
however, clearly address whether the agencies may regulate 
incidental fallback that causes environmental degradation. 
The district court also argued that Congress intended that the 
term "disposal" refers to the movement of dredged material from 
one place to another, and that incidental fallback is not an "addi-
tion" of soil because "some material simply falls back in the same 
general location from which most of it was removed.,,54 In sup-
port, the district court quoted Senator Ellender's statement dur-
ing the 1972 debates on the Act: "The disposal of dredged materi-
al does not involve the introduction of new pollutants; it merely 
moves the material from one location to another.,,55 Senator 
Ellender's remarks, however, could be interpreted to provide an 
even narrower definition of disposal than the district court's, 
that dredge material is never the addition of a pollutant, but 
merely involves moving it from one place to another. Because 
Senator Ellender did not specifically address the issue of inciden-
tal fallback and his statement represents only his views rather 
than that of an entire committee or the Senate as a whole, his 
remarks cannot be considered conclusive. 
c. Congress implicitly ratified the agencies' earlier interpretation 
that excluded incidental fallback from section 404. 
The district court also contended that Congress implicitly 
ratified "through its lack of amendment" the agencies' and 
courts' earlier interpretation that excluded incidental fallback 
52. [d. at 273 (quoting Senate Report on section 1952, 95th Cong., reprinted in 
1977 Legis. Hist. at 924). 
53. [d. at 273. 
54. [d. at 273-74. 
55. See id. at 273 (quoting Senate Debate on section 2770, reprinted in 1972 
Legis. Hist. at 1386). 
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from section 404.56 The failure of Congress to amend a statute, 
however, is of only very limited value in determining the intent 
of the original enacting Congress in 1972. Furthermore, the 
failure of Congress to amend a statute can result from a number· 
of causes other than agreement with an agencies' interpretation, 
including internal congressional divisions or lack of interest. 57 
Because congressional inaction may stem from many different 
reasons, courts only apply the principle of de facto ratification in 
those rare cases where there is clear evidence that Congress 
knew about an agency interpretation and relied on that interpre-
tation as a primary reason not to take legislative action. There 
is no clear evidence that Congress explicitly relied on the 
agencies' pre-Tulloch interpretation of section 404.58 The court's 
related argument that Congress implicitly ratified the agencies' 
prior interpretation that dredging and incidental fallback are not 
disposal activities because Congress amended other subsections 
of 404 several times without disturbing the prior interpretation 
of subsection 404(a) regarding incidental fallback, 59 suffers from 
the same flaw. There is no evidence cited by the plaintiffs or the 
district court that Congress explicitly considered the incidental 
fallback issue or extensively debated it when it periodically 
amended the Act. 
Similarly, the fact that there have been several proposals in 
recent years to expand the scope of section 404 and that Con-
gress has not enacted any of them60 does not prove the intent of 
the 1972 statute. Legislative failure often results from complex 
causes involving the building of coalitions, legislative inertia, 
overlapping environmental jurisdiction among committees, espe-
cially in the House of Representatives, and lobbying by interest 
groupS.61 Furthermore, members of Congress who sought to 
56. Id. at 274·75. 
57. See National Petroleum Refiners Assoc. v. F.T.C., 482 F.2d 672, 695·96 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973) (observing that there are many causes for congressional inaction), cert. 
denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974); see generally Bradford C. Mank, The EPA's Regulatory 
Reform Initiatives: The Need for Legislative Action, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. (forthcoming 1998) 
(addressing reasons for congressional gridlock and fragmentation in addressing envi· 
ronmental legislation). 
58. See National Petroleum Refiners, 482 F.2d at 695·97. 
59. See Public Citizen v. FAA, 988 F.2d 186, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("Congress is 
presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation when it re·en· 
acts a statute without change.") (citation omitted). 
60. American Mining Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 276. 
61. See National Petroleum Refiners Assoc. v. F.T.C., 482 F.2d 672, 695·96 (D.C. 
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broaden section 404 may have been attempting to clarify what 
they consider an ambiguous statute or to avoid litigation rather 
than repealing a restrictive statute that clearly did not allow the 
agencies to regulate incidental fallback from excavation.62 Anal-
ogously, the fact that a White House press release announcing 
the Tulloch rule stated that Congress should amend the .Act63 
does not prove that the Act clearly forbids that rule's interpreta-
tion, but it may merely suggest that section 404 is ambiguous 
regarding whether incidental fallback may be regulated or that 
officials were seeking to avoid potentially lengthy litigation. The 
district court drew far too many inferences from mere legislative 
inaction or proposals when there were many other interpreta-
tions, including the possibility that leaders in Congress or the 
White House thought that section 404 was ambiguous regarding 
the regulation of incidental fallback. 
2. Excavation Sites Are Not "Specified Disposal Sites" 
According to the district court, "Even if the term 'addition of a 
pollutant' were broad enough to cover incidental fallback, the 
court would still hold that the Tulloch rule departs from 
Congress' intent that the material must be discharged at a 'spec-
ified disposal site'."64 The court argued that the language "speci-
fied disposal site" indicated that the "site must have been affir-
matively selected as a disposal site by the agencies," and "also 
conveys Congress' understanding that 'discharges' would result 
in the relocation of material from one site to another."65 The 
court contended, "The Tulloch rule makes the term 'specified 
disposal site' superfluous; under the rule, all excavation sites are 
considered 'specified disposal sites'."ss As a result, according to 
Judge Harris, the Tulloch rule misreads the statute by treating 
Cir. 1973) (observing that there are many causes for congressional inaction), cert. 
denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974); see generally Mank, supra note 57. 
62. See National Petroleum Refiners, 482 F.2d at 696 (observing that Congress 
may amend a statute "out of uncertainty, understandable caution, and a desire to 
avoid litigation"). 
63. See American Mining Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 276 & n.20 (citing White 
House Office on Environmental Policy, Protecting America's Wetlands: A Fair, Flexi-
ble, and Effective Approach 23 (Aug. 24, ·1993». 
64. American Mining Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 278. 
65. [d. 
66. [d. 
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excavation sites as disposal sites when the plain language of the 
statute means that "specified disposal sites" are "the place[s] 
where the dredged material is disposed of' rather than where it 
is excavated.67 In addition, the court invoked the statutory can-
on noscitur a sociis,68 to maintain that its interpretation of "dis-
posal" as referring to the movement of soil was reinforced by 
Congress' use of the term "specified disposal sites" in section 
404(a)9.69 
IV. UNDER CHEVRON, THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD 
HAVE DEFERRED TO THE TULLOCH RULE 
A. The Chevron Doctrine 
Under Chevron, a court first examines "whether Congress has 
directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of 
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as 
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously ex-
pressed intent of Congress.,,70 If a statute is ambiguous or con-
tains a gap, however, the court in the second level of analysis 
must defer to the agency's interpretation if it is "permissible," or 
in other words, if it is reasonable.71 If a statute contains a "gap" 
or is ambiguous, the Chevron doctrine creates a presumption 
that Congress implicitly delegated the resolution of this issue to 
the agencies. 72 
67. Id. 
68. "It is known from its associates." Under the canon of noscitur a sociis, the 
meaning of an uncertain or questionable word is gathered from the words surround-
ing it. See, e.g., Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995) (resolving 
statutory question with noscitur a sociis); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Commu-
nities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 702 (1995) (diSCUSSing application of the 
doctrine to a regulation promulgated under the Endangered Species Act). 
69. American Mining Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 273-74. 
70. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 842-43 (1984). 
71. See id. at 840, 843-45; Bradford C. Mank, Is a Textualist Approach to Statu-
tory Interpretation Pro-Environmentalist?: Why Pragmatic Agency Decisionmaking Is 
Better than Judicial Literalism, 53 WABH. & LEE L. REV. 1231, 1242 (1996); Kenneth 
W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 284 (1986). 
72. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 (finding that Congress sometimes implicitly 
delegates to the agency the authority to fill in the gaps in the statute); Mank, supra 
note 71, at 1244 (explaining that "Chevron appeared to presume that whenever Con-
gress delegated authority to administer a statute, it also delegated authority to the 
agency to fill in any gaps present in the statute, rather than leaving that role to the 
judiciary"); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE 
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Chevron does not require judicial acquiescence to all agency 
interpretations. A court makes an independent judgment in 
deciding whether the statute has directly spoken to a question, 
and does not defer to the agency in de.termining whether the 
legislation ·is ambiguous.73 In making its independent assess-
ment of a statute's meaning and congressional intent, a court 
may "employO traditional tools of statutory construction,"74 and 
may examine particular statutory language, the language and 
structure of the statute as a whole, and, where appropriate, 
legislative history. 75 
Nevertheless, the Chevron principle does not require an 
agency's interpretation to be the most likely or popular, but 
merely a permissible interpretation of an ambiguous statute.76 
Indeed, Justice Scalia has argued that "Chevron becomes virtual-
ly meaningless, it seems to me, if ambiguity exists only when the 
arguments for and against various interpretations are in abso-
lute equipose,"77 and that judges must defer to an agency inter-
pretation "when two or more reasonable, though not equally 
valid, interpretations exist."78 Judge Harris failed to recognize 
that the agencies' interpretation that incidental fallback can be a 
form of disposal under section 404 was a plausible interpretation 
of an ambiguous statutory provision, even if his own interp~eta­
tion may be a better reading of the Act. 
B. The District Court's Argument for Not Following Chevron 
The district court rebuffed all of the agencies' arguments about 
the importance of deferring to agency expertise under the Chev-
ron doctrine because the court was firmly convinced that Con-
gress did not intend for the agencies to regulate under section 
L.J. 969, 979 (1992) (stating that "Chevron in effect adopted a fiction that assimilat-
ed all cases involving statutory ambiguities or gaps into the express delegation or 
'legislative rule' model"); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpre-
tations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 516-17 (suggesting that Chevron presumes that 
ambiguities entail delegation of interpretative power). 
73. See Cajun Elec. Power Coop. v. FERC, 924 F.2d 1132, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
74. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9. 
75. See Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 919 F.2d 
158, 162 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
76. See Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). 
77. See Scalia, supra note 70, at 520. 
78. Scalia, supra note 70, at 521. 
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404 either dredging or the incidental fallback that inevitably 
accompanies such operations, but intended that provision to 
govern only the disposal of dredged material in another loca-
tion.79 The district court cited both prior agency pronounce-
ments and caselaw to demonstrate that both excavation activi-
.ties and incidental fallback from such operations were beyond 
the scope of the statute.so According to the district court, only 
one prior case had considered incidental fallback to be a regu-
lated discharge, Reid v. Marsh,s1 a 1984 decision by a federal 
district court in Northern Ohio. The Reid court, however, held 
that the Corps was limited to considering the effects of the dis-
charge itself, and that the Corps could not address the overall 
effects of the entire dredging activity.s2 Because incidental 
fallback is a normal byproduct of dredging and Congress did not 
intend to r~gulate removal activities under section 404, the dis-. 
trict court concluded that Congress could not have intended to 
regulate incidental fallback pursuant to that statutory provi-
sion.s3 
In addition, Judge Harris argued that dredging or removal 
activities are outside the Act's jurisdiction because such opera-
tions are exclusively within the domain of section 10 of the 1899 
Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act.s4 Even the Reid court 
acknowledged that dredging in itself is regulated by section 10, 
and is not within the scope of section 404 unless there is a dis-
charge of fill or dredged material that causes direct environmen-
tal effects.s5 While the act of dredging or excavation in itself is 
probably exclusively within the reach of the 1899 statute, howev-
er, that does not directly answer whether incidental fallback 
79. American Mining Congress v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 951 F. Supp. 267, 274 
(D.D.C. 1997). 
80. Id. (citing Salt Pond Assocs. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 815 F. 
Supp. 766, 778, 782 (D. Del. 1993); United States v. Lambert, 18 Env't Rep. Cas. 
(BNA) 1294, affd, 695 F.2d 535 (11th Cir. 1983); 51 Fed. Reg. at 41210. 
81. Reid v. Marsh, 20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1337, 1342 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (hold-
ing that even de minimis incidental fallback from dredging activities may constitute 
disposal under section 404 of the Clean Water Act). 
82. See id.; 58 Fed. Reg. at 45012 (arguing Reid improperly limited Corps juris-
diction to environmental effects of discharge and that Corps actually has authority to 
regulate indirect effects associated with dredging). 
83. American Mining Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 274-75. 
84. See id. at 272-73; 33 U.S.C. § 403 (Corps must authorize excavation or filling 
of navigable waters). 
85. See Reid, 20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1342. 
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from such activities is outside section 404. In addition, the agen-
cies also claimed the authority to regulate indirect or secondary 
environmental degradation associated with dredging, mechanized 
landclearing, ditching, channelization or excavation activities as 
long as there is a discharge of dredged or fill material, including 
incidental fallback.86 
Furthermore, the district court contended that the Tulloch 
rule impermissibly focuses on the "environmental effects of 
Uandclearing or excavation] activit[ies] resulting in the dis-
charge, rather than on the discharge itself.,,87 The district court· 
is absolutely correct that a discharge is a prerequisite for section 
404 jurisdiction and that the agencies simply do not have the 
authority under the Act to regulate environmental impacts in the 
absence of a discharge but, again, this point does not resolve 
whether incidental fallback can ever be a form of discharge.88 
The court also argued that the agencies' reinterpretation was 
entitled to less weight because of its inconsistency with their 
prior interpretations.89 The court acknowledged that "[a]gencies 
are, of course, permitted to revise their interpretations" of an 
ambiguous statute, but maintained that the statute was not 
ambiguous.9o The agencies had contended that their increased 
experience with the harmful environmental effects of excavation 
and landclearing activities provided a "reasoned analysis for the 
change.,,91 The district court rejected this argument, however, 
because "it is not apparent to the Court how this experience 
would alter the agencies' interpretation of congressional in-
tent."92 
86. See 58 Fed. Reg. at 45011-13; see also supra part lILA. 
87. American Mining Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 275 n.18. 
88. [d. 
89. [d. at 274 n.13 (citing Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1987)). 
90. [d. (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 184-88 (1991». 
91. Texas Rural Legal Aid v. Legal Servs. Corp., 940 F.2d 685, 690 (D.C. Cir. 
1991) (holding that agency may change policy if it provides reasoned analysis for 
change); see 58 Fed. Reg. at 45015 (stating agencies' belief that change in agency 
policy in Tulloch rule "is warranted in light of our increased understanding of the 
severe environmental effects often associated with the activities covered by the rule" 
and is based on "reasoned analysis"); see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n. v. State 
Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983) (observing that change in agency 
policy must be based on "reasoned analysis"). 
92. American Mining Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 274 n.13. _ 
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C. Why Chevron Is Applicable 
Section 404 is ambiguous regarding whether incidental 
fallback from dredging, landclearing or excavation operations 
constitutes "disposal" under section 404, and, accordingly, the 
district court erred in failing to defer to the agencies' plausible 
interpretation of the Act. While the available legislative history 
suggests that Congress in 1972 or 1977 did not intend to regu-
late de minimis incidental fallback from dredging or excavation 
activities that do not cause environmental degradation,93 Con-
gress did not clearly address the possibility that incidental 
fallback might be significant in volume or environmental effects. 
Accordingly, there is an ambiguity or gap in the statute regard-
ing whether the agencies may regulate incidental fallback that 
causes environmental degradation. Because Congress did not 
specifically address whether incidental fallback is a form of "dis-
posal" or the "addition of a pollutant," the Chevron doctrine cre-
ates a presumption that Congress implicitly delegated the resolu-
tion of this issue to the agencies.94 
Even if the agencies' interpretation is not the most likely one, 
the Tulloch ~ule is a permissible interpretation of an ambiguous 
statute. While the agencies in 1986 and many prior judicial deci-
sions had rejected that interpretation,95 the Reid decision in 
1984 had read the term "discharge" to include the direct environ-
mental impacts of even de minimis incidental fallback. 96 In ad-
dition, the agencies have plausibly suggested that Congress did 
not address whether the agencies should have the authority to 
regulate indirect or secondary environmental degradation associ-
ated with dredging, mechanized 1 andclearing, ditching, channel-
ization or excavation activities as long as there is a discharge of 
dredged or fill material, including incidental fallback and, ac-
cordingly, have suggested that their interpretation to include 
such secondary effects is entitled to deference under the Chevron 
doctrine.97 Because section 404 is ambiguous regarding whether 
incidental fallback causing environmental degradation consti-
93. See supra Part III.B.!. 
94. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 843·44 (1984). 
95. See American Mining Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 275 n.17. 
96. Reid v. Marsh, 20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1337, 1342 (N.D. Ohio 1984). 
97. See 58 Fed. Reg. at 45011·13. 
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tutes the "addition of a pollutant" and "disposal," then, contrary 
to the district court's assertion, the agencies' experience that 
incidental fallback has important environmental effects consti-
tutes reasonable grounds for changing their interpretation of the 
statute and issuing the Tulloch rule.98 
Furthermore, the Tulloch rule serves the Act's broad purposes, 
which are to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical and 
biological integrity of the Nation's waters.,,99 While the district 
court properly observed that such broad purposes are relevant 
only if a statute is ambigUous and does not demonstrate that 
Congress intended to delegate "unrestricted authority" to an 
agency/oo the Supreme Court has sometimes given an agency 
the benefit of the doubt in deciding whether a complex regulato-
ry statute is ambiguous if its interpretation advances a statute's 
broad purposes. lOl 
While the district court is probably right that a distinction 
ought to be made between an excavation site and a "specified 
disposal site," the court again fails to consider the possibility 
that the statute is ambiguous when incidental fallback causes 
environmental degradation at the excavation site. If that is so, 
then the Tulloch rule appropriately recognizes that excavation 
sites also can be, under some circumstances, disposal sites as 
well. 
98. Compare Texas Rural Legal Aid v. Legal Servs. Corp., 940 F.2d 685, 690 
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (observing that agency experience is grounds for altering its inter-
pretation of a statute) and 58 Fed. Reg. at 45015 (stating agencies' belief that 
change in agency policy in Tulloch rule "is warranted in light of our increased un-
derstanding of the severe environmental effects often' associated with the activities 
covered by the rule" and is based on "reasoned analysis") with American Mining Con-
gress, 951 F. Supp. at 274 n.13 (arguing that agency experience is irrelevant if· 
statute's original intent contradicts agency interpretation). 
99. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). 
100. American Mining Congress, 951 F. Supp. at 277. 
101. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 
U.S. 687, 703-08 (1995) (invoking Chevron deference principle and statute's broad 
purposes as grounds for deferring to Secretary of Interior's interpretation of term 
"harm" in Endangered Species Act); Mank, supra note 71, at 1265, 1278-90 (arguing 
that courts should give considerable deference to agency interpretations of complex 
regulatory statutes). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
While Chevron was supposed to increase judicial deference to 
agency interpretations, some empirical evidence suggests that 
courts are no more, or even less, likely to defer to such interpre-
tations than before the Supreme Court unanimously decided that 
case. l02 Courts too frequently are unwilling to defer to an agen-
cy interpretation that a judge believes is less plausible than her 
own explication of statutory meaning. l03 There are significant 
costs when a court fails in appropriate circumstances to defer to 
an agency's interpretation because: (1) agencies are closer to the 
political branches than courts, and hence more likely to provide 
an interpretation consistent with popular values; (2) agencies 
normally possess greater scientific and technical expertise than 
courts; (3) agencies can provide greater flexibility by changing a 
statutory interpretation when experience demonstrates the need 
for a change; and (4) agencies can provide greater uniformity 
than lower courts by providing a consistent interpretation that 
does not vary from circuit to circuit. l04 For all these reasons, 
agencies are often more capable of interpreting complex "intran-
sitive" regulatory statutes that have no clear meaning than 
102. See Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle, 57 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 65, 103 (1994) (concluding that affirmance rates in federal 
appellate courts dropped from mid-70% range in 1983-1987 to mid-60% range in 
1988-1990); Mank, supra note 71, at 1245-47 (citing sources); Merrill, supra note 72, 
at 982 (explaining that during the late 1980s and early 1990s, Supreme Court ap-
plied Chevron in only one-third of applicable cases); Richard J. Pierce, The Supreme 
Court's New Hypertextualism: An Inpitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the 
Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 750-52, 762-63 & passim (1995) (explain-
ing that during 1990-1994, the Supreme Court frequently invoked the "plain mean-
ing" principle to avoid invoking Chevron deference); Peter H. Shuck & E. Donald 
Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 
1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1038 (finding that although Chevron initially increased 'deference 
by federal appellate courts, most of this effect had weakened by 1988). 
103. See generally Mank, supra note 71, at 1278-92 (arguing that textualist judges 
frequently ignore the spirit of Chevron by arguing that statute's text has a plain 
meaning); Pierce, supra note 102, at 750-52. 
104. See generally Mank, supra note 71, at 1278-90 (arguing that agencies provide 
greater political sensitivity, expertise and flexibility than courts); Peter Strauss, One 
Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited 
Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1987) (con-
tending that judicial deference to agency interpretations enhances regulatory unifor-
mity because the Supreme Court can review so few cases, and, therefore, agency 
interpretations provide more uniformity than potentially conflicting lower court deci-
sions). 
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generalist Article III judges.105 
Judge Harris makes a number of reasonable arguments in 
contending that Congress did not intend section 404 to regulate 
dredging activities or the inevitable incidental fallback from such 
operations. He failed to demonstrate, however, that Congress in 
1972, 1977 or any time since, specifically addressed the issue of 
incidental fallback. Accordingly, there is a gap, silence or ambi-
guity in what Congress' intent was regarding this issue and 
Chevron compels judicial deference to the agencies' plausible 
interpretation of the statute. 
In addition, Judge Harris' decision would undermine the broad 
purposes of the Act by preventing the agencies from regulating 
incidental fallback that causes environmental degradation. The 
Tulloch rule appropriately exempted incidental fallback that had 
only de minimis environmental impact, although it placed a 
significant burden on regulated parties to demonstrate that their 
activities would not cause environmental degradation. lOS While 
reasonable people might disagree with whether the burden 
should be on the agencies or on the regulated to establish that 
their dredging operations will cause only de minimis effects, 
courts should defer to the agencies' experience regarding where 
to place that burden. 107 
Judge Harris would have required the agencies to rescind the 
Tulloch rule on a nationwide basis. lOS Fortunately, the Court of 
Appeals has stayed Judge Harris' decision pending the outcome 
105. See Mank, supra note 71, at 1280-81; see also Edward L. Rubin, Modern 
Statutes, Loose Canons, and the Limits of Practical Reason: A Response to Farber 
and Ross, 45 V AND. L. REV. 579, 580-87 (1992) (explaining that most federal statutes 
are addressed to specialized audiences). 
106. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 323.2(d)(1)(iii), (d)(4) (Corps regulations); 40 C.F.R. 
§§ 232.2(1)(iii), 232.2(4) (EPA regulations); 58 Fed. Reg. at 45019-21, 45035-3!! (defin-
ing "destroy" and "degrade" and "de minimis"); American Mining Congress v. Army 
Corps of Eng'rs, 951 F. Supp. 267, 270 & n.3 (D.D.C. 1997); Dinkins, supra note 9, 
at 735. 
107. See 58 Fed. Reg. at 45015 (stating agencies' belief that change in agency 
policy in Tulloch rule "is warranted in light of our increased understanding of the 
severe environmental effects often associated with the activities covered by the rule" 
and is based on "reasoned analysis"); Fed. Reg. at 45021-22 (creating a presumption 
that dredging and excavation activities destroy or degrade). 
108. American Mining Congress v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 962 F. Supp. 2 (D.D.C. 
1997). On defendants' motion to alter or amend judgment, the District Court, Judge 
Stanley Harris, held that injunctive relief would not be restricted to plaintiffs, but 
would apply nationwide. [d. 
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of the agencies' appeal. 109 Following Chevron, the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit should reverse the 
district court and reinstate the Tulloch rule. 
109. See Wetlands: Corps Again to Require Excavation Permits as Appeals Court 
Stays Lower Court Ruling, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 596 (1997) (reporting that court of 
appeals stayed Judge Harris' injunction pending appeal). 
